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Susan Machler*
No man is an island entire of itseU; every man is a piece of
the continent, a part of the main .... Any man's death
diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and
therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls
for thee.'
When I was a small child, my dad taught me a lesson in
euthanasia, about choosing the time of dying. I grew up on a
large farm in central Montana. One evening when I was very
young, not even in school yet, I went with my dad to pen up
some sheep and lambs for the night. It was a beautiful early
summer night, one of the first evenings where you could be
comfortable without a jacket. After having been bundled up
all the long Montana winter, feeling warm air moving across
my bare skin was freedom itself.
In the part of Montana where we live, the earth is flat, and
the sky is a big dome overhead. On this night with my dad, the
top of the dome was deep blue. The blue turned lighter toward
the edges of the sky, except in the west where it was pink.
Big, broad brush-strokes of high, pink clouds came streaking
out of the northwest, as if they were hurrying, like almost
everything else, to get across Montana on their way to some
other place. I heard birds and lambs. I smelled the creek, the
wild roses, and the sheep.
As my dad chased the sheep through the gate, one old ewe
ran right into the gatepost and fell. She got up very slowly,
and when she did, she was shaking and drooling and stum-
bling. It was obvious that she was blind.
My dad walked around the sheep looking carefully at her.
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Finally, he put his hand on her head and looked up at the sky.
He bit his lip. He kicked around in the tall grass by the fence
and picked up a piece of metal pipe about three feet long. He
hit the sheep on the back of the head with it. She dropped to
the ground. After a few seconds, the sheep stopped breathing,
but she shook for a long time.
When she stopped shaking, my dad crouched beside me.
He said, "You understand she's dead? When you live with ani-
mals, you learn that things die. You will never belong on a
farm until you learn this."
So it is with people. It is simply not true that we can
refuse to "play God," to refuse to make decisions about death.
People make life and death decisions everyday about medical
treatment, about what kind of medical treatment, about who
should receive medical treatment, and, increasingly, about
who should pay for medical treatment. As medical knowledge
becomes more technologically advanced and more expensive,
these decisions will become more common and more complex.
Moreover, an increasing number of people want to make
their own decisions regarding medical treatment, which has led
to a growing movement to create rights for the dying. Nancy
Cruzan is a symbol of one concern of this movement-the
removal of life support systems from comatose patients.2 The
work of Dr. Jack Kevorkian,3 the Hemlock Society,4 and the
writers of the Washington State Death With Dignity Act5 rep-
resent another concern-creating a legal mechanism whereby
terminally ill patients may commit suicide with the help of
their doctors, so-called active voluntary euthanasia or physi-
cian-assisted suicide.6
Courts have responded to the needs of dying patients and
their families by defining a right to die under certain circum-
stances.7 Legislatures have also responded by passing statutes
2. See infra part II.
3. Dr. Jack Kervorkian is a controversial physician who regularly assists
terminally ill patients in committing suicide.
4. Formed in 1980, the Hemlock Society campaigns for the rights of terminally ill
people to choose "voluntary euthanasia." The Hemlock Society claims to have 70
chapters and 38,000 members. DEREK HUMPHRY, FINAL EXIT: THE PRACTICALITIES OF
SELF-DELIVERANCE AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING 180 (1991) (published by The
Hemlock Society).
5. Proposed Initiative 119, to amend WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.122 (West Supp.
1992).
6. See infra part IV.B.
7. See, e.g., In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987); In re Hamlin, 102
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that allow life support equipment to be withdrawn under cer-
tain circumstances.' Many statutes adopt in whole or in part
the Uniform Rights of the Terminally Ill Act.9
The current statutory and common law therefore reflect
the needs of comatose patients or those for whom death is
imminent.'0 These laws also respond to the needs of families
and the medical profession." Safeguards are provided in the
statutes to protect the patient from mistake and undue influ-
ence by others through requirements of a directive signed by
the patient and witnessed,12 an independent diagnosis of termi-
nal condition by two physicians before the directive becomes
effectuated,' 3 and a reasonable effort by the attending physi-
cian to determine if the directive complies with the statute and
reflects the patient's desires.'4
However well these "living will" or "natural death acts"
may work for comatose patients, or those for whom death is
imminent, these statutes and their underlying policies will not
serve those who would choose physician-assisted suicide. This
is true for three reasons. First, the group of comatose patients,
or those facing imminent death, is limited by the requirement
that they must be receiving some sort of medical treatment,
usually artificial life supports, which can be withdrawn or
withheld.'5  Patients who request physician-assisted suicide
may not be receiving any treatment, which therefore makes
the group of qualified patients less easily defined.
Second, the patient who would choose physician-assisted
Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984); In re Ingram, 102 Wash. 2d 827, 689 P.2d 1363
(1984); In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
8. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 70.122 (West Supp. 1992).
9. UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT, 9B U.L.A. 96 (West 1992).
10. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.010 (West Supp. 1992); UNIF. RIGHTS
OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AT, 9B U.L.A. 96, 97 (West 1992).
11. See UNIF. RIGHTS OF THE TERMINALLY ILL AcT §§ 7, 8, 9B U.L.A. 96 (West
1992) (providing authority to spouses, adult children, parents, and other family
members to consent or withhold consent to the withdrawal of medical treatment, and
also providing for the transfer of patients to another health care provider if the
current provider refuses to comply with the consent of the individual to withdraw
treatment).
12. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.030(1) (West Supp. 1992).
13. Id. § 70.122.030(2).
14. Id. § 70.122.060.
15. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989); In re Conroy, 486
A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 422
(1976); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64 (N.Y.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981);
Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (Cal. App. 1988), cert denied, 488 U.S.
958 (1988).
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suicide is conscious and physically able to express his or her
intent to commit suicide. Such a patient need not be protected
from mistake by others as to his or her consent, but instead
may need protection from a hastily made decision on his or her
own part. A competent patient may also need protection from
too much protection by the state, which may interfere with his
or her right to choose physician-assisted suicide.
16
Third, the law does not view comatose patients, or patients
on artificial life support systems who are near death, as com-
miting suicide.' 7 But competent patients who request physi-
cian-assisted suicide are clearly commiting suicide.
Consequently, any law that allows physician-assisted suicide
must define when suicide is acceptable and not mere self-
destructiveness.
This Comment will focus on the constitutional and com-
mon law backgrounds of suicide and the right to refuse medi-
cal treatment, the need for well-articulated policies on right-to-
die issues, and a possible legislative solution that will balance
the needs of dying individuals with society's interest in
preventing abuse. Until we develop policies regarding physi-
cian-assisted suicide, we are leaving the needs and the protec-
tion of the dying to "people with pipes." We are leaving
policymaking to whomever wins the battle between a doctor
who invents suicide machines and a prosecutor who wants to
put the doctor in jail for an act that is not a crime.'8 We are
leaving the resolution of the euthanasia question to do-it-
yourself books' 9 and physicians who practice euthanasia
underground.
16. See Craig A. Brandt et al., Model Aid-In-Dying Act, 75 IOWA L. REv. 125 (1989)
(proposing a model act that requires a signed directive delivered to the primary
physician and state registry and approval by an aid-in-dying board).
17. See id. at 133-34.
18. Dr. Jack Kevorkian was charged with murder on February 6, 1992, after he
provided his "suicide machine" to a terminally ill individual. The charges were
dropped July 21, 1992. The court ruled that Michigan had no law prohibiting assisting
suicide. However, a new law will make such assistance a felony. The law will be in
effect for fifteen months while the issue is being studied. Kevorkian Assists 9th
Suicide; Lawyer Expects More Such Actions, CHIC. TRIB., Jan. 21, 1993, at 19.
19. See, e.g., HUMPHRY, supra note 4.
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I. PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE: THE PROBLEM AND THE
PROBLEM WITH SOLUTIONS
Darkling I listen, and for many a time
I have been haf in love with easeful death,
Called him soft names in many a mused rhyme,
To take into the air my quiet breath;
Now more than ever seems it rich to die,
To cease upon the midnight with no pain... 20
A. The Problem
As the examples provided below demonstrate, the interest
in physician-assisted suicide is not limited to organizations such
as the Hemlock Society. Physicians and patients who have
never heard of the Hemlock Society have assisted and asked
for assistance. In fact, there has been enough interest to put
physician-assisted suicide measures on the ballots and before
the legislatures in Washington, Oregon, California, Florida,
and New Hampshire.2
0 In March 1990, the New England Journal of Medicine
reported the story of a patient named Diane whose physi-
cian, Dr. Timothy E. Quill, helped end her life.22 A grand
jury refused to indict Quill.
23
e In May 1991, a Detroit jury acquitted Bertram Harper
of Loomis, California, of second-degree murder in the
death of his wife who suffered from liver cancer. Mr.
Harper, his wife, and her daughter traveled to Michigan
where there was no law at the time prohibiting physician-
assisted suicide. Mrs. Harper died in a hotel room after
swallowing sleeping pills and tying a plastic bag over her
head.24
20. John Keats, Ode To A Nightingale 6 (1819), reprinted in THE NEW OXFORD
BOOK OF ENGLISH VERSE 606 (Helen Gardner ed., 1972).
21. Timothy E. Quill et al., Care of the Hopelessly Ilk Proposed Clinical Criteria
for Physician-Asisted Suicide, 327 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1380, 1381 (1992).
22. Timothy E. Quill, Death and Dignity: A Case of Individualized Decision
Making, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 691 (1991).
23. B.D. Colen, Doctors Who Help Patients Die, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1991, at 4.
24. Man Who Helped Wife Commit Suicide Is Acquitted of Murder, CHIc. TRIB.,
May 11, 1991, at 2. The TRIBUNE reported that Mrs. Harper took sleeping pills with
alcohol and pulled a plastic bag over her head, securing the bag with rubber bands.
She became uncomfortable several times, and in each case her husband helped her
remove the bag. When she lost consciousness, her husband secured the bag one last
time. This method of combining sleeping pills with a plastic bag is recommended by
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* In June 1991, Dr. Jack Kevorkian revealed that he had
assisted in the death of Janet Atkins of Portland, Oregon,
an Alzheimer's patient, with his own invention: a suicide
machine that he had placed in the back of a van. Dr.
Kevorkian was not charged with a crime, but the judge
ordered him never to use his suicide machine in Oregon
again.25
* In October 1991, Dr. Kevorkian assisted two Michigan
women in ending their lives. Dr. Kevorkian's license to
practice medicine was revoked in November 1991, and he
was charged with murder on February 6, 1992.26
0 In November 1991, voters in Washington narrowly
rejected a physician-assisted suicide initiative. Only fifty-
four percent of the voters opposed the initiative, which
would have legalized physician-assisted suicide for those
with less than six months to live. If the initiative had
passed, Washington would have been the only place in the
world to legalize active voluntary euthanasia for anyone
medically qualified.27
* In January 1992, a national magazine featured the story
of news reporter Betty Rollin who helped her mother
commit suicide and escape the last stages of ovarian
cancer.28
The problem is that these examples do not represent a
mere passing fad. First, studies have shown that perhaps as
many as six thousand deaths per day in the United States are
"planned or indirectly assisted." Most of these deaths proba-
bly occured through the use of pain relieving drugs, which may
the Hemlock Society to ensure that the individual does not regain consciousness or is
not discovered until after death occurs. See HuMPHRY, supra note 4, at 97.
25. Nancy Gibbs, Dr. Death Strikes Again, TIME, Nov. 4, 1991, at 78.
26. Joe Treen et al., Appointment in Cabin 2: Dr. Jack Kevorkian Helps Two
More Women Die and Reignites a Furor, PEOPLE, Nov. 11, 1991, at 85. Marjorie Wantz
and Sherry Miller died in a cabin overlooking Tamarack Lake, fifty miles north of
Detroit. Wantz, who died with the assistance of Dr. Kevorkian's suicide machine,
suffered from a painful genital disorder. Miller, who died by inhaling carbon
monoxide, was a victim of multiple sclerosis. Id.
27. Warren King, Both Sides Claim Victory In 119 Vote, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Nov.
7, 1991, at A9. See also Paul van der Maas et al., Euthanasia and Other Medical
Decisions Concerning the End of Life, 338 THE LANcET 669, 669 (1991) (noting that
physician-assisted suicide is not legal in the Netherlands, but that physicians are
seldom prosecuted if they abide by certain strict rules).
28. Karen S. Schneider & Sue Carswell, Love Unto Death, PEOPLE, Jan. 20, 1992,
at 56.
29. Quill et al., supra note 21, at 1381.
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hasten death for patients already near death, or through the
withholding or withdrawal of life sustaining treatment.30 Phy-
sician assistance in death is not limited to an occasional patient.
Second, the number of patients who will face incurable ill-
nesses will increase during the coming years, making it likely
that requests for physician-assisted suicide will become more
common. For example, government studies estimate that in
1992 the number of Americans with AIDS reached 200,00031
and that over 24,000 people died from AIDS in 1990 alone.32
Many people will commit suicide and would benefit from the
availability of legalized physician-assisted suicide.
In addition, the U.S. Census Bureau estimates that by the
year 2000, older Americans will be the largest age group in the
population. 3 Many of these older Americans will suffer from
debilitating diseases, such as cancer and Alzheimer's disease,
which may cause a slow or painful death. Many of these indi-
viduals will commit suicide.
In fact, studies indicate that over one-third to one-half of
those individuals who have committed suicide were over sixty
years old, and most of them were physically ill.34 The U.S.
Census Bureau reported in 1988 that the suicide rate among
people fifty-five years and older was nearly thirty-seven for
every one hundred thousand persons.35 The suicide rate for all
ages is just over twelve for every one hundred thousand per-
sons.' If physical illness is indeed a major cause of suicide
among older people, it is conceivable that many of these older
individuals would qualify for and prefer physician-assisted
suicide.
Clearly, most people do not want to die a slow, painful
death or to be connected to life-support equipment and then
left to die alone in a hospital. Looking back on an experience
on life support, patients who recover remember the painful
30. Id.
31. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL,
HIV/AIDS SuRVEILANcE 5 (Oct. 1992).
32. U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES 1991, at 83 (111th ed. 1991) [hereinafter 1991 STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
33. Id. at 16.
34. Bruce L. Danto, Suicide Among Cancer Patients, reprinted in SUICIDE AND
EUTHANASIA: THE RIGHTS OF PERSONHOOD 28 (Samuel E. Wallace & Albin Eser eds.,
1981).
35. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 32, at 86.
36. Id.
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and intrusive nature of life support equipment. One person
expressed no doubt that he would not want to be on life sup-
port again, for any length of time, unless his prognosis was
very good. 7 And, as one court wrote, "a terminally ill patient
may wish to avoid not only prolonged suffering, but also '[t]he
ultimate horror .. . of being maintained in limbo, in a sterile
room, by machines controlled by strangers.' ""
Some patients are lucky. Dr. Timothy Quill's patient, for
example, was able to communicate her wishes to someone she
trusted, who could act on her behalf, and who was sympathetic
to her circumstances. Dr. Quill stated:
I wrote the prescription [for barbituates] with an uneasy
feeling about the boundaries I was exploring-spiritual,
legal, professional, and personal. Yet I also felt strongly that
I was setting her free to get the most out of the time she had
left, and to maintain dignity and control on her own terms
until death.-9
Medical science may be able to keep us alive longer, but
many of us do not believe that a long life is necessarily a good
life. Moreover, it is becoming more acceptable for patients to
make decisions about medical care that may result in their
deaths sooner rather than later. We have a great deal of sym-
pathy for the patient who is in pain or who is facing a painful
death, like many cancer patients, or a long, slow decline of
both physical and mental abilities, like patients afflicted with
multiple sclerosis or Alzheimer's disease. We do not, however,
have many solutions to help these patients.
B. The Problem With Solutions
Unfortunately, many patients must find their own "self-
deliverance" because the law does not provide any relief for
those who wish to take action regarding the end of life. As the
following discussion will show, physician-assisted suicide will
not come about as a mere extension of current law on the right
to die. There are two obstacles to such an extension of the law.
First, the limited amount of constitutional law and state com-
37. Bruce Williams, TALNET radio broadcast, Feb. 13, 1992.
38. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 556, 747 P.2d 445, 451 (1987) (quoting In re
Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 340 (Minn. 1984)). For an analysis of In re Grant, see Stephen
P. VanDerhoef, Note, In re GranL Where Does Washington Stand on Artcwial
Nutrition and Hydration?, 13 U. PUGET SouND L. REv. 197 (1989).
39. Quill, supra note 22, at 693.
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mon law regarding the "right to die" is based on the concepts
of informed consent and the withholding or withdrawing of
unwanted medical treatment.' Until recently, many courts
allowed withholding or withdrawing lifesaving medical treat-
ment only under narrow circumstances where the patient was
comatose or in a persistent vegetative state.41 Further, most
cases involve discontinuing treatment for the permanently
unconscious individual and the standards required by the
courts for substituted judgment to protect the patient from the
erroneous decisions of others.42
In the last few years, competent patients have been
allowed to refuse emergency or life-saving medical treatment
even though the practical effect was that the patients would
probably die.4 3 Some courts have extended this right to non-
emergency life-sustaining treatment and have allowed the
removal of nutrition and hydration or respirator tubes from
competent, non-terminal adults, even though the practical
effect is suicide. 44 Although all of these decisions are based on
the doctrine of informed consent and the withholding or with-
drawal of medical treatment, courts have experienced
problems when medicine collides with society's prohibition
against suicide.
The prohibition on suicide is the second obstacle to physi-
cian-assisted suicide. Even in cases where treatment is refused,
courts have had difficulty reconciling the right to refuse treat-
ment with the reality that conscious patients are choosing to
die. It is, after all, clear that when a fully conscious, mentally
alert adult requests to have his life support system discon-
nected, he or she is deciding to end his or her own life. A
court must explain how it can allow the patient to end his or
her life without condoning suicide.
40. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
41. See, e.g., In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 552, 747 P.2d 445, 448-49 (1987).
42. See, e.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. 2841; In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
43. See Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (pregnant patient refusing blood transfusion); Wons v.
Public Health Trust of Dade County, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (patient refusing blood
transfusion); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E. 2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (elderly patient
refusing medical treatment for gangrenous leg); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J.
Super. Ct. P. Div. 1978) (elderly patient refusing medical treatment for gangrenous
leg); In re Melideo, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (patient refusing blood
transfusion).
44. See, e.g., State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Gergstedt, 801
P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986).
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Courts have used two different rationales in attempting to
reconcile the right to refuse treatment with the prohibition on
suicide. The first is to view the patient as not committing sui-
cide.4" The second is a grudging acquiescence that maybe it is
acceptable for some people to commit suicide." Though not
expressing it in so many words, some courts seem to agree that
there are people who might think that their lives are not
worth living and may allow them to have respirators or feeding
tubes removed.
How legislatures and courts deal with physician-assisted
suicide will depend in part on how they define society's atti-
tude toward suicide. The first rationale for allowing the with-
drawal of life support equipment (i.e., that the patient is not
committing suicide) cannot justify physician-assisted suicide. It
cannot be argued that a patient is not really committing suicide
because he or she does not want to die; the patient is asking for
a drug that will quickly end his or her life. It is necessary,
therefore, to adopt the second rationale that society may allow
some people to commit suicide.
The following sections describe the conceptual problems
that occur at the nexus between suicide and legally recognized
self-determination in the doctrine of informed consent. New
laws that allow physician-assisted suicide must overcome these
conceptual problems in order for society to allow self-determi-
nation on a level normally prohibited.4" If suicide is allowed,
clear policies must be formulated to re-define where self-deter-
mination ends and self-destruction begins.
II. U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE CRUZAN CASE
[H]ere I am mine own ghost ... Miserable... posture where
I must practice my lying in the grave by lying still and not
practice my resurrection by rising any more! 48
In 1983, Nancy Cruzan was injured in a car accident.
Although paramedics restored her breathing, her brain was
deprived of oxygen for too long and she was left in a persistent
45. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986); Bartling
v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 1984); Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d
160 (Fla. App. 1978).
46. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
47. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2859 (Scalia,
J., concurring).
48. Donne, supra note 1, at 61.
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vegetative state. Nancy might have responded to stimuli with
a simple motor reflex, but she was unaware of herself or her
surroundings. She did not need a respirator, but she did
require a gastrostomy nutrition and hydration tube.49 It was
this tube that Nancy's parents wanted disconnected, which
would have meant, of course, that Nancy would starve to
death.'
The trial court found that Nancy would be deprived of
equal protection of the law if her co-guardians were not
allowed to terminate her artificial nutrition and hydration
treatment."' The Missouri Supreme Court, however, reversed
and held that Nancy's personal choice to terminate treatment
could be exercised for her only if the formal requirements of
the Missouri Living Will statutes were satisfied or if there was
clear and convincing and inherently reliable evidence of
Nancy's wish to die.52 The court found that the evidence
presented by Nancy's co-guardians was not clear and convinc-
ing.' The United States Supreme Court held that Missouri
could require such evidence s4
The Cruzan case is the first decision from the United
States Supreme Court regarding the right to refuse life-sus-
taining treatment and its place in federal constitutional law.
The Court applied a typical substantive due process analysis in
order to: first, find the existence of the individual right or lib-
erty interest in refusing or withdrawing medical treatment;
second, determine if the state had a compelling interest that
allowed it to infringe on this right; and, third, decide if artifi-
cial nutrition and hydration is a form of medical treatment
that can be withheld or withdrawn as part of the right to
refuse treatment.
Although the Court discussed each of these issues, it did
not make a specific determination on each one. Rather, the
Cruzan holding is narrow and only addresses the evidentiary
standards that a state may impose on those who wish to exer-
cise substituted judgment and refuse treatment on behalf of an
49. See Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A gastrostomy tube is
inserted surgically into the stomach.
50. Id. at 2846.
51. Cruzan, by Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988), cert granted,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
52. Id. at 425.
53. Id. at 426.
54. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854.
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incompetent patient. The Court did not hold that any "right to
die" exists. It assumed for this case only that a competent per-
son has a liberty interest in refusing forced, life-sustaining
medical treatment, including artificially delivered food and
hydration, and held only that Missouri's evidentiary standard
for substituted judgment did not violate this interest.5 The
Court's analysis in this regard is summarized in the following
subsections.
A. Liberty Interest
In coming to its holding, the Court first found that a lib-
erty interest in withholding or withdrawing medical treatment
is grounded in the common law right of informed consent to
medical treatment and its logical corollary of the right not to
consent.' The Court began its analysis by quoting Judge Car-
dozo, who in 1914 described the right to consent to surgery as
the right to be free from bodily intrusion: "Every human being
of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs
an operation without his patient's consent commits an assault,
for which he is liable in damages."57
Thus, as recognized by the Court, this entire area of law
arose from the intentional torts of assault and battery and the
defense of consent. Specifically, before another person, even a
physician giving medical treatment, can intrude on another
person's body, he or she must have consent. There is no con-
sent unless the person consenting can say "yes" or "no" as he
or she pleases, making the right to refuse essential to the
entire doctrine of informed consent. In the absence of consent,
the intruding person may be guilty of battery.-s
To determine whether the common law right to refuse
medical treatment is a liberty interest protected by the Consti-
tution, the Court next examined whether the Court, or a state
supreme court, has traditionally protected this right or
whether it falls under the penumbra of a fundamental right,
such as the right of privacy.5 9 The Court first analyzed In re
55. Id. at 2854.
56. Id. at 2847.
57. Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914)).
58. W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 112-19 (5th ed.
1984).
59. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 85 S. Ct. 1678 (1965).
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Quinlan6° and reviewed the various approaches that state
courts have taken to find that patients can refuse or withdraw
life-sustaining treatment.61
The Court observed that although some courts have found
that the common law is sufficient to support a refusal or with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment, other courts have found a
constitutional privacy right or liberty interest in their state
constitutions.62 Similar to the common law rights, the consti-
tutional rights are grounded in the notion of consent and the
patient's ability to say "yes" or "no." Consequently, patients
may have a privacy right or liberty interest in preventing
unwanted bodily intrusions by others in the form of medical
treatment.
For example, in In re Quinlan,' the New Jersey Supreme
Court found that Karen Quinlan had a constitutional privacy
right that allowed her to have medical treatment withdrawn.'
However, because substantive due process allows a state to
interfere with an individual's rights when there is a compelling
state interest, the rights of the individual must be balanced
against the state interest in preserving life.6 In light of this,
the New Jersey court found that when the "degree of bodily
invasion increases and the prognosis dims," the rights of the
individual outweigh the interests of the state.'
The Cruzan Court also considered Superintendent of
60. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
61. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2847. The Court's discussion focuses on cases that deal
only with the permanently unconscious patient. Those state cases applying the same
principles to fully conscious patients is provided infra part III.
62. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292 (Ill. 1989) (finding only common law
right to informed consent); Superintendant of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,
370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977) (finding both right of privacy and right to informed
consent); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985) (finding only common law right to
self-determination and informed consent); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert
denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976) (finding a right of privacy); In re Storar, 420 N.E.2d 64
(N.Y. 1981), cert denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981) (finding only common law right to
informed consent).
63. 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
64. Id. at 654. On April 24, 1975, Karen Quinlan stopped breathing at least twice
for fifteen-minute periods. She was admitted to the hospital and placed on a
respirator. The lack of oxygen during those fifteen-minute periods caused her
comatose condition. The condition known as a "persistent vegetative state" is
permanent. Id. at 653. Quinlan's father petitioned in September 1975 to have her
declared incompetent and to have himself named guardian with an express power to
authorize the withdrawal of the life support equipment. Id. at 651. This request was
finally granted on March 31, 1976, after appeals to the New Jersey Supreme Court.
65. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 663. See also Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851-52.
66. Quinlan, 355 A.2d at 664.
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Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,6 7 in which the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court outlined a basic test for the state
interests that must be weighed against the individual's com-
mon law or constitutional rights.61 The Saikewicz test recog-
nizes four possible state interests: the preservation of life, the
protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide,
and the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical
profession. The individual's interests outweigh these state
interests where "the issue is not whether, but when, for how
long, and at what cost to the individual [a] life may be briefly
extended. '6 9
As noted by the Court in Cruzan, the individual's interest
is characterized by the battery aspect of the doctrine of
informed consent: the right to say "yes" or "no" to bodily inva-
sion and the right to be left alone. 70 The key inquiry when
weighing the individual's interest is whether, and to what, the
patient has consented.7' Because very few people can or do
leave behind their express intent in living wills, patient direc-
tives, or durable powers of attorney, the courts must decide
whether the patient would have consented to the medical
treatment.
The Cruzan Court's analysis of state cases revealed two
approaches that have been used to determine to what medical
treatment a patient would have consented. One approach is
where a guardian or family member (and ultimately the court)
decides "what is best.' 7' The other approach is a stricter
"intent" test where the court requires some evidence of the
patient's actual desires regarding the kind of medical treat-
ment he or she is receiving. 73 The standard of evidence varies
67. 370 N.E. 2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
68. Id. at 425. Joseph Saikewicz was a 67 year-old man with the mental age of a
two year-old. By the time he died in 1976 before his case was decided, he had been a
resident of Massachusetts state institutions for over 53 years. He had leukemia, which
could be treated by chemotherapy, giving him a 30-40 percent chance of remission for a
period of 2 to 13 months. Doctors would have been unable to administer the
chemotherapy, requiring intravenous application of drugs for 12 to 24-hour-a-day
periods of up to 5 days each time, without completely restraining Mr. Saikewicz.
69. 1d at 426.
70. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846-47.
71. Id. at 2852.
72. See In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (N.J. 1985) (life-sustaining treatment
may be withheld or withdrawn if either of two "best interests" tests are satisfied).
73. See In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989) (a surrogate
decisionmaker attempts to establish what decision the patient would make if he were
competent to do so).
[Vol. 16:781
Euthanasia
from court to court.
In In re Westchester County Medical Center on Behalf of
O'Connor,74 for example, the court rejected the idea of "sub-
stit[uting] its judgment as to what would be an acceptable qual-
ity of life for another. Consequently, [the court resolved to]
adhere to the view that, despite its pitfalls and inevitable
uncertainties, the inquiry must always be narrowed to the
patient's expressed intent with every effort made to minimize
the opportunity for error. '75 In this way, the New York court
preserved the concept that the right to refuse treatment is
grounded in the doctrine of informed consent. Without clear
and convincing evidence of whether that consent actually
would have been given, the court would not permit the with-
holding of life-sustaining treatment.76
As a result of the Cruzan Court's analysis of these state
court decisions, it found a basis in the common law for a right
to refuse medical treatment.77 The Court also noted several
Supreme Court cases implicating a liberty interest when medi-
cal treatment is imposed as part of confinement 7 and con-
cluded that a constitutionally protected liberty interest in
refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from its
prior decisions.79
B. Compelling State Interest
In applying a traditional due process analysis, the second
issue for the Court was whether Missouri's clear and convinc-
ing intent requirement would impermissibly infringe on the
right to refuse treatment. The Court held that it did not.80
Specifically, the Court identified three state interests pro-
tected by the requirement of clear and convincing evidence of
the patient's intent.8' First, the requirement protects a patient
from family members who may not act to protect the patient's
interests.8 2 Second, the requirement provides added protection
in judicial competency proceedings, which may not be adver-
74. 531 N.E.2d 607 (N.Y. 1988).
75. 1&L at 613 (citation omitted).
76. Id. at 613-15.
77. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 1& at 2852.
81. Id. at 2853.
82. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853.
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sarial.8 Third, the requirement reflects a legitimate refusal by
the state to evaluate a patient's quality of life and to assert
instead an unqualified interest in the preservation of life." In
the opinion of the Supreme Court, Missouri's clear and con-
vincing standard of proof permissibly attempts to protect these
state interests.85
C. Artijwial Nutrition and Hydration and the Right to
Refuse Medical Treatment
The final issue addressed by the Court in the Cruzan deci-
sion was whether artificially delivered nutrition and hydration
is a medical treatment that may be refused or withheld. 6
Although the cases cited by the Court seem to adopt the view
that artificial nutrition and hydration is a medical treatment, it
was not, and still is not, an issue without controversy. The
majority opinion merely refers to another court's discussion of
the "emotional significance" of food without discussing the
issue of whether food and water can be defined as medical
treatment.8 7 The majority merely assumed, again, for the pur-
poses of the case, that the Constitution would grant a compe-
tent person a protected right to refuse life-saving nutrition and
hydration.8'
But the controversy surrounding whether artificial nutri-
tion and hydration should be characterized as medical treat-
ment is reflected in the opinions of the Court. For example,
Justice O'Connor emphasized in her concurring opinion that
artificial nutrition and hydration is much like a medical proce-
dure. Justice O'Connor stated the following:
Feeding a patient by means of a nasogastric tube requires a
physician to pass a long flexible tube through the patient's
nose, throat and esophagus and into the stomach. Because of
the discomfort such a tube causes, "[m]any patients need to
be restrained forcibly and their hands put into large mittens
to prevent them from removing the tube.".. . A gastrostomy
tube or jejunostomy tube must be surgically implanted into
the stomach or small intestine."9
83. Id.
84. Id. at 2853.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 2852.
87. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2849.
88. Id. at 2852.
89. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting David Major, The Medical
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Furthermore, Justice O'Connor agreed that artificial nutrition
and hydration cannot be readily distinguished from other
forms of medical treatment.90
Justice Brennan indicated in his dissenting opinion that
not only is artificial nutrition and hydration a medical treat-
ment, it is not even particularly safe. A gastrostomy tube
"may obstruct the intestinal tract, erode and pierce the stom-
ach wall or cause leakage of the stomach's contents into the
abdominal cavity. The tube can cause pneumonia from reflux
of the stomach's contents into the lung."'" From these descrip-
tions one finds it hard to imagine just what the "emotional"
qualities are that separate this kind of feeding from other
forms of medical treatment.
Nevertheless, there is no escaping the fact that, whether
called a medical procedure or not, removing artificial nutrition
and hydration tubes means that the patient will starve to
death. Some judges, including members of the Washington
Supreme Court, have expressed the opinion that withdrawing
artificial nutrition and hydration is cruel.92
The desire to prevent cruelty and mistake is the focus of
Cruzan as well as the state court cases relied on by the Court.
Before families and medical personnel can take the drastic and
final step of disconnecting artificial life support systems from
helpless people who cannot express themselves, courts want
the families and medical personnel to be sure that the patient
actually would have given consent. Consent is not the only
issue facing courts, however. As illustrated in the next section,
courts are more reluctant to disconnect artificial life support
systems from conscious patients who are capable of expressing
their desires by giving their consent. When a conscious person
wants to withdraw artificial life support, the central issue is
not whether the person consented, but whether the person is
committing suicide.
Procedures for Providing Food and Water: Indications and Effects, in BY No
EXTRAORDINARY MEANS: THE CHOICE TO FORGO LIFE- SUSTAINING FOOD AND WATER
25 (Joanne Lynn ed., 1986)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
92. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987). See also Farnam v. Crista
Ministries, 116 Wash. 2d 659, 807 P.2d 830 (1991). Washington House Bill 1481 was
signed into law on March 31, 1992. The new law allows withholding of artificial
nutrition and hydration from terminally ill or comatose patients who have expressed
their intent in a healthcare directive. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.020(5),
70.122.030 (West 1993).
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III. STATE LAW: SUICIDE AND INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
Could Ifit myself to stand or sit in any man's place, and not
to lie in any man's grave? I may lack much of the good
parts of the meanest, but I lack nothing of the mortality of
the weakest; they may have acquired better abilities than I,
but I was born to as many infirmities as they.93
The analysis in Cruzan focused on the rights of uncon-
scious or incompetent patients who must have the decision to
refuse medical treatment exercised for them. This section, in
contrast, analyzes state court decisions that address a conscious
person's right to refuse life-saving or life-sustaining treatment.
In each case the patient refused treatment with full knowledge
that he or she would probably die. Thus, in each case the court
was asked to strike some balance between respect for individ-
ual self-determination and society's reluctance to condone
suicide.
It is important to come to terms with the suicide issue
because any law regarding active voluntary euthanasia will
require society's acquiescence either that the patient is not
committing suicide or that suicide is acceptable in certain cir-
cumstances. Until it is articulated when suicide is acceptable,
we will be unable to help the dying or to protect them from
those who might abuse them. The following state court cases
will demonstrate that the suicide issue has been poorly articu-
lated and that there is still much to learn and resolve on this
issue.
On the surface, the argument for allowing a conscious
individual to refuse treatment seems simple: One, the decision
to withhold or discontinue life-sustaining treatment is based on
evidence of the patient's consent or what his or her consent
would have been. Two, the patient is conscious and expressing
his or her refusal or wish to withdraw the life-sustaining treat-
ment. Three, the patient's desires must be honored and the
tubes removed.
Unfortunately, it is not that simple. There is a difference
between a person who is comatose, or in a vegetative state, and
a person who is able to communicate and think. And it is pre-
cisely this difference that makes withholding or withdrawing
life-sustaining treatment a more painful decision. When the
patient is comatose, withdrawing treatment may be seen as an
93. Donne, supra note 1, at 68.
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end to suffering. However, when the patient is conscious and
alert, suspending life-sustaining treatment comes uncomforta-
bly close to suicide. In fact, to some judges, it is suicide.
94
When state courts have extended the common law and
constitutional concepts of refusal or withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment to competent patients, the balancing of state
and individual interests focuses on suicide instead of consent.
Courts have dealt with suicide in two types of cases. First,
courts permit competent adults to refuse emergency life-saving
treatments, such as blood transfusions or amputations, even
though the patient will probably bleed to death or die of infec-
tion without the transfusion.9" Second, courts permit compe-
tent adults to have respirators and artificial nutrition and
hydration systems removed, even though such removal means
that the patient will soon die.96
In all of the following decisions, the patient's rights are
based on the same common law and constitutional liberty
interest to refuse or withdraw treatment. However, unlike the
cases involving incompetent patients, the courts weigh the
interests of the state much more heavily than the suffering of
the individual, because the competent patient is still a func-
tioning member of society-"for I am involved in mankind."9 7
A. Refusing Life-Saving Treatment
Cases of the first group involve patients who because of
their religious beliefs refuse blood transfusions or refuse to
consent to an amputation.9" In Norwood Hospital v. Munoz,"
94. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring) (the state has the power to
prevent suicide, including suicide by refusing to take measures necessary to preserve
one's life). See also McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 632 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J.,
dissenting).
95. See State v. McAfee, 385 S.E.2d 651 (Ga. 1989); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d
617 (Nev. 1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986).
96. See, e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990); Bouvia v. Superior
Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986).
97. Donne, Devotions, supra note 1, at 68.
98. See Application of the President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331
F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (pregnant patient refusing blood transfusion); Wons v.
Public Health Trust of Dade County, 541 So. 2d 96 (Fla. 1989) (patient refusing blood
transfusion); Lane v. Candura, 376 N.E. 2d 1232 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978) (elderly patient
refusing medical treatment for gangrenous leg); In re Quackenbush, 383 A.2d 785 (N.J.
Super. Ct. P. Div. 1978) (elderly patient refusing medical treatment for gangrenous
leg); In re Melideo, 390 N.Y.S.2d 523 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (patient refusing blood
transfusion).
99. 564 N.E.2d 1017, 1022 (Mass. 1991).
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for example, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found
both a common law right to refuse treatment and a constitu-
tional right of privacy to refuse medical treatment for a
woman who refused a blood transfusion. The court noted that
the "fact that the treatment involves life-saving procedures
does not undermine [the patient's] rights to bodily integrity
and privacy. ..... ," However, like the cases involving the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment from incompetent
patients, the court found that the interests of the patient must
be weighed against the interests of the state.1 1
The Massachusetts court in Munoz applied the same four
state interests that it had applied previously in Superintendant
of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz :102 the preservation
of life, the prevention of suicide, the maintenance of the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical profession, and the protection of
innocent third parties. In Saikewicz, the court permitted the
withholding of chemotherapy from a profoundly retarded
sixty-seven-year-old man, who was given only a thirty to forty
percent chance of living for two to thirteen months."' 3 The
court found the state's interest in the preservation of life most
significant, considered the ethical integrity of the medical pro-
fession, and found the prevention of suicide and the protection
of innocent third parties inapplicable."°4
In Munoz, on the other hand, where the patient was a con-
scious, competent individual, the court gave a great deal more
weight to all four state interests. Specifically, the court first
rejected the notion that the patient was essentially committing
suicide, reasoning that because the patient did not want to die,
the refusal of treatment was not suicide.0 5 The court relied on
Saikewicz, which identified three tests for suicide: specific
intent to die, death from the introduction of a death producing
agent, and evidence of an irrationally self-destructive pur-
pose."° The court distinguished between an individual's right
to refuse treatment and the notion that it is acceptable for
individuals to take their own lives."°7
100. Id. at 1021.
101. Id.
102. 370 N.E.2d 417, 426 (Mass. 1977).
103. Id. at 425.
104. Id. at 427.
105. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d at 1022.
106. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.
107. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d at 1022 n.5.
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Second, the court weighed the state's interest in preserv-
ing life, but it concentrated not merely on saving a life, but on
preserving the quality of life. The court stated that "the right
to privacy is an 'expression of the sanctity of individual free
choice and self-determination as fundamental constituents of
life. The value of life as so perceived is lessened not by a deci-
sion to refuse treatment, but by the failure to allow a compe-
tent human being the right of choice.' ",
Thus, in recognizing the value of quality of life, the Munoz
court determined that because of the patient's religious beliefs,
the intrusive nature of a blood transfusion lessened the value
of her life; receiving a blood transfusion would preclude resur-
rection and everlasting life."° The court stated that "[t]he
quality and integrity of this patient's life after a blood transfu-
sion would be diminished in her view. Therefore, . . . the
State's interest in protecting the sanctity of life must give way
to the patient's decision to forgo treatment."1 0
The third state interest considered by the court in Munoz
was preserving the integrity of the medical profession by giv-
ing hospital personnel "a full opportunity to assist those in
their care.""' On this interest, the court stated that
so long as we decline to force the hospital to participate...
there is no violation of the integrity of the medical profes-
sion .... [M]edical ethics do not require that a patient's life
be preserved in all circumstances... [and] the ethical integ-
rity of the profession is not threatened by allowing compe-
108. Id. at 1023 (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 426).
109. Id. at 1018.
110. Id. at 1023. It is ironic that the analysis of the "sanctity of life" involves
essentially an inquiry into the quality of life. Several courts have refused to evaluate
the quality of a patient's life in cases that involve permanently unconscious patients,
and they considered only the patient's intent. See, e.g., In re Estate of Longeway, 549
N.E.2d 292, 299 (Ill. 1989); In re Westchester County Medical Center on Behalf of
O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988). A New York court, for example, refused to
substitute its judgment as to what would be an acceptable quality of life for another
individual. Westchester County, 531 N.E.2d at 613. The court was understandably
reluctant to say that the patient may prefer to die.
Nevertheless, courts apparently have little difficulty evaluating the "sanctity" or
"value" of life when it concerns a competent patient, even when that patient is still
capable of making that judgment alone and is clearly expressing his or her intent. See,
e.g., McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 624 (Nev. 1990); Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225
Cal. Rptr. 297, 305 (Cal. App. 1986). Perhaps because competent, functioning
individuals are still "involved in mankind," we are reluctant to let them die without
questioning their judgment. Perhaps we do not want to articulate the precise moment
when it is agreed that life is no longer worth living.
111. Munoz, 564 N.E.2d at 1023.
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tent patients to decide for themselves whether a particular
medical treatment is in their best interests."l 2
The final state interest, protecting innocent third parties,
was the most important interest to the Munoz court.113 In fact,
the trial court ordered the blood transfusions because of the
patient's minor child." 4 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court reversed, reasoning that the child would not be aban-
doned in the event the patient should die because she had a
husband who supported her decision and who could care for
the child." 5
Cases such as Munoz involve emergency, life-saving proce-
dures and the patient's ability to refuse such procedures as pro-
tected by the doctrine of informed consent. A blood
transfusion is an intrusive medical treatment that always
involves the risk of transmitting hepatitis and AIDS. In addi-
tion, there is always the possibility that the patient may sur-
vive without the transfusion, as happened in Munoz. However,
the circumstances become more like suicide when the medical
treatment involves a long-term respirator or artificial nutrition
and hydration care, which are not clearly medical "treat-
ments," but the continuation of life itself.
Moreover, when the life support system is already in place,
there is no clear refusal of treatment. The patient is not saying
"I want nature to take its course." Rather, the patient is ask-
ing that an affirmative act be taken to disconnect the machine
and end his or her life. This is the action/inaction dilemma
that is sometimes used to mark the line between withholding
treatment and suicide. For example, in Saikewicz, the intro-
duction of a death producing agent was one of the three tests
for suicide used by the court.116
In addition, taking action so that a conscious patient dies
by suffocation or starvation causes suffering and does not end
suffering as in the cases involving permanently unconscious
patients." 7 This implicates potential conflicts with medical
ethics. For example, the Hippocratic Oath requires physicians
112. Id. (citations omitted).
113. Id. at 1024.
114. Id. at 1019.
115. Id. at 1024-25.
116. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
n.11 (Mass. 1977).
117. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626, 641 n.2 (Mass. 1986)
(describing the physical effects of dehydration and starvation leading to death).
[Vol. 16:781
Euthanasia
to "never do harm to anyone." 118
The following cases demonstrate how courts have grappled
with these issues. In each case, although the court allowed the
discontinuance of the treatment, it is clear that the decision
was not easy, and, in one case, a dissenting judge just could not
do it." 9 Nevertheless, the courts in the following cases give
competent patients the same right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment as has been given to patients who are comatose or in
a persistent vegetative state.
B. Withdrawing Treatment When the Patient is Near Death
In Satz v. Perlmutter,2 ° seventy-three-year-old Mr. Perl-
mutter was so debilitated by Lou Gehrig's disease that he
required a respirator, without which he had a "reasonable life
expectancy of less than one hour."'' The hospital refused his
request to have the machine disconnected. Mr. Perlmutter
told the judge at a bedside hearing that the result of removing
the respirator tube "can't be worse than what I'm going
through now.'1 22 The judge ordered that Mr. Perlmutter could
either remain in the hospital without the respirator or he
could leave the hospital without the respirator. 2 3 The Florida
District Court of Appeals affirmed.
1 24
The Satz court used two of the three suicide tests from
Saikewicz1 5 to weigh the state's interest in preventing suicide.
Namely, Mr. Perlmutter did not want to die. The court noted
that: "[H]e really wants to live, but to do so, God and Mother
Nature willing, under his own power."' 26 Moreover, his death
would not be caused by a "death producing agent."'"
Although discontinuing the respirator would effectively cause
Mr. Perlmutter's immediate death, the court instead analo-
gized the removal of the respirator to the refusal or the discon-
tinuance of another form of treatment. The court stated that:
It is true that [disconnecting the respirator] appears more
118. Hippocratic Oath, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 650 (5th unabr. ed. 1982).
119. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 632 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J., dissenting).
120. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
121. Id. at 161.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 161-62.
124. Id. at 162.
125. See supra text accompanying note 106.
126. Satz, 362 So. 2d at 162.
127. Id.
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drastic because affirmatively, a mechanical device must be
disconnected, as distinct from mere inaction. Notwithstand-
ing, the principle is the same, for in both instances the hap-
less, but mentally competent, victim is choosing not to avail
himself of one of the expensive marvels of modern medical
science.128
The court also explored the state's interest in the ethics of
the medical profession. Once again adopting the language of
Saikewicz, the court found that:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without excep-
tion, demand that all efforts toward life prolongation be
made in all circumstances. Rather, ... , the prevailing ethi-
cal practice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more
often in need of comfort than treatment.... It is not neces-
sary to deny a right of self-determination to a patient in
order to recognize the interests of doctors, hospitals, and
medical personnel in attendance on the patient. Also, if the
doctrines of informed consent and right of privacy have as
their foundations the right to bodily integrity and control of
one's own fate, then those rights are superior to the institu-
tional considerations. 1
29
Thus, Mr. Perlmutter had the respirator withdrawn know-
ing that he would die, and the Florida court apparently did not
think that his death was suicide. However, it must be consid-
ered that Mr. Perlmutter was old, he was suffering, and he
would have died soon from natural causes anyway. As in the
cases where the patient is comatose, the withdrawal of life-sus-
taining treatment is still more analogous to an end of suffering
rather than the taking of a life.
On the other hand, there are cases where the patient is
not really suffering physically, has an alert mind, and could
conceivably live for years with the help of an artificial respira-
tor or a nutrition and hydration system. In Bouvia v. Superior
Court,"3 the California Court of Appeals found that the right
128. Id. at 163.
129. Id. at 163-64 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown State School v.
Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426-27 (Mass. 1977)) (citations omitted).
130. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986). Elizabeth Bouvia was born with cerebral
palsy and was later afflicted with degenerative arthritis. She was completely
bedridden and could not move except for a few fingers of one hand and some facial
movements. In addition to the nutrition and hydration tubes, Elizabeth had a tube
permanently attached to her chest, which injected her with regular doses of morphine,
although she was never free of pain. Previously, Elizabeth had been married and
earned a college degree. Id. at 300.
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to refuse or discontinue medical treatment in such cases is
based on the right of privacy protected by both the California
and federal constitutions. 13  The court also found that the
right to discontinue artificial life-support extends to competent
adults even though the withdrawal of the treatment will
hasten their deaths, possibly by many years.
132
C. Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment When the
Patient is Not Near Death
It is in this category of patients where the doctrine of
informed consent breaks down as a justification for the with-
drawal of medical treatment. Although the patient is clearly
able to articulate his or her refusal of the medical treatment,
the patient is clearly choosing to die. It is here that the doc-
trine of consent conflicts with the state's interest in preventing
suicide. The two cases that follow exemplify the difficulty
courts face in reconciling these conflicting interests.
In the first case, Bouvia v. Superior Court,133 Elizabeth
Bouvia, a quadriplegic with cerebral palsy and crippling arthri-
tis, was forcibly connected to an artificial nutrition and hydra-
tion system against her will. Elizabeth had previously dictated
express written instructions to her lawyers that she did not
wish to be kept alive by artificial life-support. Nevertheless,
despite the doctrine of informed consent and Bouvia's express
desire, the doctors connected her to the machine."3
When considering her appeal to have the life-support dis-
connected, the court adopted the reasoning of another Califor-
nia Court of Appeals case, Bartling v. Superior Court.'35 The
Bouvia court found that the fact that the patient was alert,
mentally competent, and capable of a "cognitive, sapient life,"
did not limit the exercise of the patient's right to refuse life-
sustaining treatment, stating that the right to refuse treatment
131. Id. at 301.
132. Id. at 305.
133. 225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. App. 1986).
134. Id. at 300.
135. 209 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Cal. App. 1984). Mr. Bartling was seventy-years-old and
suffered from emphysema, chronic respiratory failure, an abdominal aneurysm, a
malignant tumor of the lung, alcoholism, and depression. When his lung collapsed and
could not be reinflated, he was attached to a respirator. Later, doctors attempted to
wean him off of the respirator by detaching the machine for short periods and
gradually increasing the time off it. The weaning was unsuccessful. Mr. Bartling was
placed in "soft restraints," in which his wrists were tied to the bed with strips of
sheeting to prevent him from removing the respirator tubes. Id. at 221.
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rests with the individual." Accordingly, the court stated that
such an "exercise requires no one's approval. It is not merely
one vote subject to being overridden by medical opinion.
' ' 7
The court also found that none of the purported state
interests could limit a patient's right to refuse consent.'-1 In
particular, the court considered three state interests: the inter-
est in preserving life, the ethics of the medical profession, and
the prevention of suicide.139 When evaluating the state's inter-
est in preserving life, the court indicated that the important
consideration is the quality, rather than the quantity, of the
life preserved. 40 Thus, Bouvia may have lived for fifteen to
twenty years attached to the nutrition and hydration system,
but the court stated that "[i]f her right to choose may not be
exercised because there remains to her, in the opinion of a
court, a physician or some committee, a certain arbitrary
number of years, months, or days, her right will have lost its
meaning. '14  Therefore, according to the Bouvia court, the
state's interest in preserving life cannot outweigh the express
intent of a competent patient.
Similarly, the court found that the state's interest in pro-
tecting the ethics of the medical profession could not limit a
patient's right to refuse treatment. The court reasoned that a
medical professional cannot be subject to either civil or crimi-
nal liability for honoring a patient's denial of treatment,
because a patient has a constitutional right to refuse such
treatment.14 In addition, the Bouvia court noted that even
though the patient refused some or all treatment, the "hospital
and medical staff are still free to perform a substantial, if not
the greater part of their duty, i.e., that of trying to alleviate
Bouvia's pain and suffering.'
'14 3
The state's interest in preventing suicide presented an
interesting problem for the Bouvia court. The courts in Perl-
mutter and Munoz dispensed with the suicide issue by main-
taining that the act was not suicide because the patient lacked
136. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 302.
137. Id. at 301.
138. Id. at 304.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 305.
141. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 304-05.




a specific intent to die.'" The facts of this case, however,
demonstrated that Bouvia did want to die. Elizabeth Bouvia
had previously attempted to commit suicide by starving her-
self, which was the reason why the nasogastric tube was
administered. 145 The court had to either allow Elizabeth to
commit suicide or find another way to reach the conclusion
that removing the tube was not suicide.
To avoid confronting this troublesome issue, the court
found that Elizabeth could eat small amounts by herself, and
that she wanted to face an early natural death by malnutrition
rather than submit to the additional forced feedings; her deci-
sion to consume only what she could feed herself was a deci-
sion to allow nature to take its course.14' Also, the Bouvia
court stated that when a person exercises a constitutional
right, his or her motives for exercising that right cannot be
examined. Examination of a patient's motives could restrict
the patients' exercise of constitutional rights if his or her
motives are deemed to be "wrong" in some way. 47
Finally, the Bouvia court noted that suicide requires more
than withdrawing medical treatment. The court stated that
suicide
involve[s] affirmative, assertive, proximate, direct conduct
such as furnishing a gun, poison, knife, or other instrumen-
tality or usable means by which another could physically and
immediately inflict some death producing injury upon him-
self. Such situations are far different than the mere pres-
ence of a doctor during the exercise of his patient's
constitutional rights.1 48
144. Perlmutter, 363 So. 2d at 162; Munoz, 564 N.E.2d at 1022.
145. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 300.
146. Id. at 306.
147. Id. See also Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown
College, Inc., in which Judge Skelly Wright quoted Justice Brandeis: "The makers of
our Constitution... sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their
emotions, and their sensation, They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
man." 331 F.2d 1000, 1016 (D.C. D.C. 1964), cert denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (quoting
Amstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). Judge
Skelly Wright went on to say that "[n]othing in this utterance suggests that Justice
Brandeis thought an individual possessed these rights only as to sensible beliefs, valid
thoughts, reasonable emotions, or well-founded sensations. I suggest he intended to
include a great many foolish, unreasonable and even absurd ideas which do not
conform, such as refusing medical treatment even at a great risk." Id. at 1017
(emphasis in original).
148. Bouvia, 225 Cal. Rptr. at 306.
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This argument, however, glossed over the problem that the
removal of the nasogastric tube would require the "affirmative,
assertive, proximate and direct" act of removing the tubes
from Bouvia's body to effectuate the exercise of her constitu-
tional rights.149 Even the concurring opinion in this case
referred to the majority's reasoning as "dancing" around the
issue.' 50
Although the Bouvia court articulated a policy, it was
merely a general policy regarding constitutional rights. The
court did not address the real policy question of whether it is
acceptable for individuals like Elizabeth Bouvia to commit sui-
cide. Instead, the court manipulated the issue so that Elizabeth
Bouvia's death would not be suicide, but an exercise of her
individual constitutional rights.
A simple application of the Saikewicz suicide tests151 to
this case would indicate that Elizabeth Bouvia's death was sui-
cide because she expressed the specific intent to die and she
wanted to take affirmative action to cause her own death. The
Saikewicz tests would also require that the court consider
whether discontinuing Elizabeth's life-sustaining treatment
was suicide because she had an irrationally self-destructive
wish to end her life. 52
The Bouvia court would certainly have been on the horns
of a dilemma if it had to determine whether Elizabeth's desire
was irrationally self-destructive. If her wishes were irration-
ally self-destructive, then, under Saikewicz, Elizabeth would
be committing suicide. The Bouvia court, however, wanted to
find that Elizabeth's death was not suicide. The question then
becomes whether the court can determine that a clear desire to
end one's own life can be rational without also condoning sui-
cide and can find that the individual has made a reasonable
decision that his or her life is not worth living. In such a case,
would the court itself be making the determination that an
individual life is not worth living? It is no wonder that the
Bouvia court focused on the constitutional analysis.
The suicide issue also challenged the Nevada Supreme
Court in McKay v. Bergstedt.153 The Bergstedt court, however,
149. Id.
150. Id. at 307 (Compton, J., concurring).
151. See supra text accompanying note 106.
152. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 426
n.11 (Mass. 1977).
153. 801 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1990).
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implicated a fifth state interest: the care of the "afflicted.""M
This fifth state interest recognizes that there is a societal duty
to care for disabled individuals.-' Moreover, there is an
implied duty to provide individuals with acceptable alterna-
tives to suicide; a kind of implied duty to alleviate an individ-
ual's fear of the future.1' Arguably, this court appears to
assert that society has a duty to try to talk an individual out of
suicide.
The Nevada Supreme Court determined in Bergstedt that
Kenneth Bergstedt, a thirty-one-year-old quadriplegic who
broke his neck in a swimming accident at age ten, could have
his respirator removed.1 7 In addition, the court authorized
Bergstedt's physician to administer drugs to ease his pain
before death and concluded that the physician would be free
from any civil or criminal liability."5
The Bergstedt court found that every individual has a com-
mon law right to refuse medical treatment, as well as a consti-
tutional liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical
treatment under the Nevada State Constitution and the U.S.
Constitution.5 9 As in other cases, the individual's interest
must be weighed against the state's interests. In making this
consideration, the Bergstedt court applied the same four inter-
ests utilized by other states."6
First, when considering the state's interest in preventing
suicide, the Bergstedt court focused on the fact that Kenneth
wanted to die and that he was taking affirmative measures to
end his life.' 6 ' Instead of focusing on the nature of the actions
to be taken, such as affirmative, assertive, proximate or direct
conduct, the court distinguished Kenneth's situation from a
suicide case by using the following three factors: attitude,
physical condition, and prognosis. 6 2
As to attitude, the court reasoned that because Kenneth
merely desired to "eliminate the artificial barriers standing
between him and the natural processes of life and death that
154. Id. at 628.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 619.
158. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 631.
159. Id. at 621-22.
160. Id. at 628.
161. Id. at 625.
162. 1d
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would otherwise ensue with someone in his physical condi-
tion[,]" he was not asking to shorten the term of his natural
life.16 Therefore, Kenneth's attitude differed from that of "an
individual, otherwise healthy or capable of sustaining life with-
out artificial support who simply desires to end his or her
life.' '164 A patient who wishes to remove life-sustaining equip-
ment is neither self-destructive nor seeking death "by resort-
ing to death-inducing measures unrelated to the natural
process of dying."16' The Bergstedt court recognized that even
though Kenneth was choosing to end his life, there are certain
circumstances in which such a decision should be respected,
not prohibited.166
The court's recognition and acceptance of an individual's
desire to end his or her life is also implicit in the other two fac-
tors applied by the Bergstedt court: physical condition and
prognosis.167 An otherwise healthy individual contemplating
suicide pursues self-destruction with no physical ailment at all,
and more importantly, that individual stands a good chance of
being helped with his mental problems. An individual in Ken-
neth's position, however, "could be faced with any number of
alternatives that would delay death and consign him or her to
a living hell in which there is hopelessness, total dependence, a
complete lack of dignity, and an ongoing cost that would
impoverish loved ones."'168 In other words, a patient's physical
condition and prognosis are at their worst. Although not
stated explicitly, the Bergstedt court essentially agreed that
Kenneth's life might not be worth living.
This recognition of the physical and emotional needs of
those who are handicapped or critically ill is important. In
fact, it is critical to the development of physician-assisted sui-
cide law that policy makers identify these needs and how they
affect the patient's decision to end his or her life. Without con-
sidering these needs, the resulting physician-assisted suicide
laws will unfairly restrict decisions for some patients and will
leave other patients without adequate safeguards to prevent
mistake or undue influence.
Another important aspect of the Bergstedt decision is that
163. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 626.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 626.
167. Id, at 627.
168. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 627.
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the court authorized more than merely disconnecting the res-
pirator. The court allowed Bergstedt's care-giver to take the
further affirmative act of administering drugs to ease Ken-
neth's pain." 9 In its suicide discussion, the court refused to
undertake the action/inaction analysis of suicide, and it found
the administration of drugs to be something unrelated to the
natural process of dying. 70 The court maintained, however,
that refusing unwanted medical treatment does not mean
refusing all medical treatment.' 7' A patient can consent to
receive medication in order to relieve pain without giving up
his or her right to refuse other treatment.7 2
Moreover, the court held, the physician administering pain
relieving medication would be free from civil and criminal lia-
bility. 7 ' Like other courts,' 74 the Bergstedt court found that
allowing competent, adult patients to refuse life-sustaining
treatment does not compromise medical ethics. 7 ' The Berg-
stedt court went further than other courts, however, and
explicitly recognized the fear that the medical profession could
be used in ways that resemble the Nazis' use of German doc-
tors to effectuate their social policies. The court stated that
"[t]he State has an unquestioned duty to see that the integrity
of the medical profession is preserved and that it is never
allowed to become an instrument for the selective destruction
of lives deemed to have little utility."' 78
Partly because of the recognition of the state's role in
preventing the selective destruction of lives, the Bergstedt
court adopted a fifth state interest to be considered in these
cases: the duty of society to care for disabled individuals. The
court declared the State of Nevada as having an interest "in
encouraging the charitable and humane care of afflicted per-
sons."'177 And further, the patient, especially when capable of
"a life imbued with a potential for significant quality," must be
"fully inform[ed] .. .of the care alternatives that would have
169. Id. at 631.
170. 1I at 625-26.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 631.
174. See, e.g., Bouvia v. Superior Court, 225 Cal. Rptr. 297, 306 (Cal. App. 1986);
Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
175. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 628.
176. Id. at 627-28.
177. Id. at 628.
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been available to him."'178
In spite of such care, Kenneth may not have availed him-
self of it because of certain emotional needs that would have
remained unmet. By recognizing such needs, the Bergstedt
court showed a great deal of sympathy for the person inside
Bergstedt's body. The court recognized the typical fears of
those who are seriously ill or dependent. These fears become
important factors when a patient makes the decision to end his
or her life. The court wrote as follows:
Kenneth was preoccupied with fear over the quality of his
life after the death of his dad. He feared that some mishap
would occur to his ventilator without anyone being present
to correct it, and that he would suffer an agonizing death as
a result. In contemplating his future under the care of
strangers, Kenneth stated that he had no encouraging expec-
tations from life, did not enjoy life, and was tired of suffer-
ing. Fear of the unknown is a common travail even among
those of us who are not imprisoned by paralysis and a total
dependency upon others. There is no doubt that Kenneth
was plagued by a sense of foreboding concerning the quality
of life without his dad.
Someone has suggested that there are few greater
sources of fear in life than fear itself. In Kenneth's situation
it is not difficult to understand why fear had such an over-
riding grasp on his view of the quality of his future life. 79
In spite of the majority's sympathy for Kenneth's circum-
stances and the plight of the handicapped in general, Justice
Springer in his dissenting opinion suggested that the court
decided that Kenneth's life was not worth living because he
was handicapped.8 0 Justice Springer stated that the majority's
holding that Kenneth's respirator was medical treatment,
which would be withdrawn at will, was "a terrible and terri-
fying rationalization and, as well, a prejudicial treatment of
Mr. Bergstedt because his assisted suicide was sanctioned and
facilitated only because of his disabled condition."'' Justice
Springer went on to quote a law review article'8 2 that referred
to the Bouvia decision as a "judicial stamp of approval on nega-
178. Id.
179. Id. at 624.
180. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 635 (Springer, J., dissenting).
181. Id.
182. Belinda Stradley, Elizabeth Bouvia v. Riverside Hospital: Suicide,
Euthanasia, Murder: The Line Blurs, 15 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. L. REv. 407, 424 (1985).
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tive stereotypes about disability."'"
Furthermore, Justice Springer asked the question, "[w]hat
other conditions, physical or mental, I ask myself, will be
brought to the courts as grounds for judicially approved self-
destruction?"'84 He further stated that the Bouvia case repre-
sented a "whole array of social, ethical, theological and legal
problems that have come to us through the advancements of
medical science,' 8 5 and that it should be up to the policy mak-
ers and elected representatives to answer these questions.8 6
As the Bergstedt case emphasizes, courts are willing to
extend the right to refuse medical treatment to competent
patients even though the exercise of this right effectively
means that these patients are committing suicide. In this
respect, competent patients who wish to refuse medical treat-
ment are similar to those who wish physician-assisted suicide
in that they are making the decision to die. The difference is
that to do so, they merely have to withdraw the medical treat-
ment that they are receiving.
Many of those who would request aid-in-dying are not
receiving life-sustaining medical treatment. No case has based
its decision to allow a patient to die on any theory other than
the common law doctrine of informed consent, constitutional
rights to privacy, or the liberty interest to refuse medical treat-
ment. Even in a case where a prisoner was allowed to starve
himself to death, the court's decision turned on the prisoner's
right to refuse medical treatment of forced feedings.8 7 With-
out a right to refuse medical treatment, there is no right-to-die
for patients who request aid-in-dying. The authority to allow
physician-assisted suicide must come from the state
legislatures.
Merely providing a legal mechanism for physician-assisted
suicide, however, is only a beginning. Any statute must also
protect patients, especially the mentally and physically handi-
capped, from abuse. The following section will illustrate why
such safeguards are critical to any physician-assisted suicide
183. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d at 635.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 636.
186. Id. at 637.
187. Zant v. Prevatte, 286 S.E.2d 715 (Ga. 1982). But see In re Joel Caulk, 480 A.2d
93 (N.H. 1984) (refusing to allow prisoner to commit suicide by starvation); Von
Holden v. Chapman, 450 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. 1982) (same); State ex rel. White, 292
S.E.2d 54 (W. Va. 1982) (same).
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statute. Even though the usual rationale for the state to pre-
vent suicide is that the patient must be protected from himself,
patients may also need protection from the state and even
their "loved ones."
IV. SAFEGUARDS: THE CAMEL'S NOSE
Look, when the messenger cometh, shut the door, and hold
him fast at the door: is not the sound of his master's feet
behind him?188
Although the safeguards included in existing "natural
death" statutes may be adequate to protect those patients who
are comatose or whose deaths are imminent, the current safe-
guards may not be adequate to protect competent patients in
their decision to request physician-assisted suicide." 9 Thus,
mere amendments to existing statutes, such as the proposed
Washington State Death With Dignity Act,'9° are not sufficient
to protect competent patients. It would seem that competent
adults need fewer safeguards because they are making their
own decision and are not relying on the possibly erroneous
decisions of others. The following section will show, however,
that more protection is needed. A competent adult is still
"involved in mankind," and has a more complex life than one
who is comatose or on the verge of death.
Moreover, without sufficient safeguards, a patient who is
not capable of making his or her own decisions may be totally
without protection from abuse. Society may tend to encourage
physician-assisted suicide for the disabled or the mentally ill.
With over 99,000 mentally retarded and 270,000 mentally ill
individuals in state institutions cared for at public expense,'9 ' a
rationalization could be found to "cull the herd" like a farmer
with a pipe.
Justice Springer recognized this danger in his dissenting
opinion in Bergstedt, when he wrote that Bergstedt's suicide
was allowed only because he was disabled.192 Another author
188. Yale Kamisar, Some Non-Religious Views Against Proposed "Mercy-Killing"
Legislation, 42 MINN. L. REV. 969, 1030 n.210 (1958) (quoting 2 Kings 6:32).
189. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 70.122 (West Supp. 1992).
190. Proposed Initiative 119, to amend WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(7), (9)
(West Supp. 1992) (redefining "terminal condition" to include death within six months,
and providing a new provision allowing physician-assisted suicide).
191. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 32, at 113.
192. McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 635 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J., dissenting).
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simply stated that, "[i]t is a very short step from the right to
die to a duty to die. Behind all of it is society's belief that dis-
abled people have a duty to die."'1 9 3
Of course, these arguments are immediately recognizable
as the "slippery slope," "the wedge," and the "camel's nose"
arguments: those "fallacies" of logic which require that once
the first step is taken, no matter how reasonable, we will tum-
ble down the slippery slope, no matter how absurd. Judge Car-
dozo called it "the tendency of a principle to expand itself to
the limit of its logic."'" However, we should not be so quick to
dismiss these concerns.
Professor Kamisar told a story about how fifty years ago
certain physicians were authorized to help dying patients with
the following change in the law: "that persons who, according
to human judgment, are incurable can, upon a more careful
diagnosis of their condition of sickness, be accorded a mercy
death."'9 5 With this simple change in the law, the government
began to rid all the state and charitable institutions of the
handicapped, mentally retarded, and mentally ill. One clergy-
man who ran such an institution protested, and because he was
so popular, public opinion rallied to his side. The officials tem-
porarily gave up the program and shipped the gas chambers
used to effectuate the "mercy deaths" to Poland for use on
Jews who, ironically, were not considered "worthy" to be
included in the original mercy death program. Incidently, the
pastor's school and hospital were bombed one night in 1940,
but it was never established by whom."9
It is not enough, however, to say that "we are talking only
about an individual's right to choose. We are not Nazi's. That
will never happen here." Professor Kamisar stated the
following:
But then, neither did I think that tens of thousands of per-
fectly loyal native-born Americans would be herded into
prison camps without proffer of charges and held there for
many months, even years, because they were of "Japanese
blood," and, although the general who required these meas-
ures emitted considerable ignorance and bigotry, his so-
called military judgment would be largely sustained by the
193. Stradley, supra note 182, at 424.
194. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1921).
195. Karnisar, supra note 188, at 1034.
196. Id. at 1033-35.
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highest court of the land. The Japanese American experi-
ence of World War II undoubtedly fell somewhat short of
first-class Nazi tactics, but we were getting warm. I venture
to say it would not be too difficult to find American citizens
of Japanese descent who would maintain we were getting
very warm indeed."
Neither is it enough to say that we have learned from our
mistakes, that we have developed better procedural due pro-
cess policies since World War II, that due process will distin-
guish between patients who are dying and patients who are
physically or developmentally disabled or mentally ill, or that
procedures exist to stop anyone from clearing out society's
unwanted from state institutions. Finally, it is not enough to
rely on our attitudes as a society and assume that public out-
rage will prevent abuse of the disabled. The "parade of hor-
rors" that follow demonstrate that our attitudes toward the
disabled and the mentally ill have not progressed to provide
the needed safety net.'9 8
A. Societal Attitudes Toward the Disabled and Mentally Ill
During the last week in March 1992, an eighty-two-year-
old man with Alzheimer's disease, abandoned by his daughter
at a dog racing track in Idaho, was made a ward of Oregon's
Multnomah County and placed in a Portland care center.19
Such occurrences are apparently not so uncommon; an infor-
mal survey by the American College of Emergency Physicians
indicates that perhaps eight elderly Americans are literally
abandoned in hospital emergency rooms every week.2" Also
in March 1992, a Florida judge said that the organs of a baby
born with anencephaly"° could not be "harvested" for trans-
197. Id. at 1036-37 (referring to Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944))
(citations omitted).
198. The doubts expressed in this Comment stem partly from the author's
personal experience as a summer employee at Boulder River School and Hospital,
which is the Montana state institution for the mentally retarded. In this author's
experience, society's attitude toward the handicapped is one of "out of sight, out of
mind."
199. Lynn Steinberg, "Granny Dumping" on the Rise, SEATTLE POST-
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 27, 1992, at A3.
200. Id. at A13.
201. Thomas L. Stedman, STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 69 (5th unabr. law.
edition 1982) (defining anencephaly as a birth defect where the baby is born without
most of its brain or skull).
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plants." 2 In 1987, a heart was taken from an infant in an
anencephalic donor program at Loma Linda University in Cali-
fornia, but that program was discontinued when parents with
less severely disabled infants began bringing their babies in to
have their organs "harvested." 3 If these are the societal atti-
tudes that will protect the ill and the handicapped, they do not
inspire utmost confidence.
Whether we have been particularly progressive in accord-
ing due process protections to the mentally ill was an issue
explored in 1968, twenty years after the internment of Ameri-
can citizens of Japanese descent, in a law review article that
focused on the civil rights of the mentally ill."° The article
concluded that once the label of "mentally ill" is applied to an
individual, that individual may have fewer civil rights than he
or she thought. Professor Beaver wrote as follows:
[C]urrent law and practice as well as community under-
standing . . . respecting the allegedly mentally ill tend
increasingly to subjectivize the handling of such persons and
to dehumanize them at the same time. All too frequently
the very labeling of a human being as "mentally ill" shears
from the object of the description all civil rights.... The cat-
egorization of a man drastically affects the object of the clas-
sification; it also influences the opinions and conduct of the
classifier and virtually all onlooking humans.20 5
One example noted by Professor Beaver is the case of
Frederick Lynch,2" who wrote two checks in 1959 that
bounced. 07 When he tried to plead guilty, the court refused to
accept the plea and placed the burden of proof on the prosecu-
tion to prove Lynch sane.2"' The prosecution "did nothing to
carry this burden."201 Lynch was found not guilty by reason of
insanity and sentenced indefinitely to a mental institution.210
Had Lynch been able to plead guilty, he probably would have
202. Baby born without full brain dies, SEATLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 31,
1992, at A3.
203. Id. at A3.
204. James E. Beaver, The "Mentally Ill" and the Law: Sisyphus and Zeus, 1968
UTAH L. REV. 1.
205. Id. at 1.
206. Overhalser v. Lynch, 288 F.2d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1961), rev'd, 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
207. Id. at 389-90.
208. Id. at 390.
209. Beaver, supra note 204, at 16.
210. Id.
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received a thirty-day suspended sentence.21' Lynch committed
suicide in 1962 at the institution. 2
Once a person is labelled as terminally ill or mentally or
physically disabled, it is possible that among the other baggage
carried by these labels is a belief that the lives of those people
are not worth living. Just as we might agree that the lives of
Kenneth Bergstedt, Elizabeth Bouvia, or Nancy Cruzan were
not worth living, it might also be possible for that agreement
to attach whenever a person is labeled as terminally ill or dis-
abled, no matter how the individual might feel. Maybe this is
where we take that short step from a "right to die" to "a duty
to die."2 13
A 1987 symposium report summarized the progress made
regarding the statutory rights of the mentally ill and mentally
disabled. 14 The report concluded that "[b]ecause relatively lit-
tle attention has been paid to this body of case law, its impact
has not yet been particularly significant or far-reaching. "215
Consequently, the evidence strongly suggests that those
who could suffer from abuse will not be protected unless those
protections are required by law. Merely legalizing physician-
assisted suicide will not automatically create the needed
safeguards.
B. The Necessity of Statutory Safeguards
The safeguards needed to adequately protect patients
include treatment review, mental health and competency eval-
uations, and protection from undue influence.
The first safeguard provides for treatment review by the
attending physician and/or an independent consulting physi-
cian. Many times patients have physical symptoms, especially
pain, that are not adequately treated with the underlying dis-
ease. This constant discomfort may lead a patient to believe
that he or she wishes to die. The story of a doctor who pro-
vided drugs to his own dying brother illustrates this point:
The physician said he quickly paid a visit to his brother's
211. Id. at 15.
212. Id. at 17.
213. Stradley, supra note 182, at 427 (citing Anne Peters, Society's Victim, THE
DISABILiTY RAG 29 (Feb.-Mar. 1984)).
214. Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for
the Mentally Disabled. The Last Frontier?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1249 (1987).
215. Id. at 1326.
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doctor and asked her to provide adequate pain medication,
which she did. That the request even had to be made, he
said, points to two common problems in care of the dying-
physicians are loath to prescribe adequate painkillers... and
physicians often distance themselves from their dying
patients and fail to respond to their needs.
In less than 12 hours of receiving the additional medica-
tion, the physician's brother 'was really quite comfortable
and he remained free of any significant amount of pain for
the rest of his life, one week.'
2 16
Dr. Susan Block, a Harvard psychiatrist, agrees. Dr. Block
states that "[w]hen patients ask to die, they are often really
saying 'Can't you listen to me? .. .' And I think good medicine,
and in particular good hospice care, can... [take care of] a lot
of that. When that is done, most requests for euthanasia go
away. '2 17 Dr. van der Maas of the Netherlands wrote that "of
the serious and persistent request[s] [for physician-assisted sui-
cide] about two-thirds do not result in euthanasia or assisted
suicide since physicians can often offer alternatives.
'218
Treatment review requires that a physician review every
aspect of a patient's medical history to explore potential alter-
natives for the patient. The best way to ensure adequate treat-
ment review is to require a continuing relationship between
the physician and the patient where the physician knows the
patient and his or her individual needs. The Washington
Death With Dignity Initiative did not include treatment review
and only required that a physician administer the physician-
assisted suicide.219 Under the Death With Dignity Initiative, an
attending physician could have been any "physician selected
by, or assigned to, the patient who has primary responsibility
for the treatment and care of the patient. '220 Thus, the doctor/
patient relationship could be created on the same day that the
physician-assisted suicide is administered. Consequently, a
physician may know very little about the patient.
Doctors who already practice euthanasia, either under-
ground in this country or openly in the Netherlands, require a
continuing relationship between the doctor and the patient:
216. Colen, supra note 23, at 4.
217. Id. at 4.
218. van der Maas et al., supra note 27, at 673.
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[Tihose who help do it for patients whom they know and
trust... we never hear of physicians who help strangers to
die. One physician [said]: "The person making a head-on
approach may be pleasantly surprised. I myself will provide
prescriptions as long as the person is my patient, or someone
very close to me."2 2'
In addition, Dutch physicians who regularly assist patients
have a team of other physicians and nurses to help evaluate
the patient. The physicians also consult a representative of the
patient's faith to assist in the evaluation.2 2 2
Dr. Jack Kevorkian, who is often referred to as "Dr.
Death, ' 3 prefers visiting patients weekly, and then daily, to
establish that the patient truly desires to end his or her life.
Dr. Kevorkian also carefully screens his patients and excludes
those who want to end their lives for the wrong reasons.
Finally, Dr. Kevorkian requires each of his patients to consult
with a psychiatrist, and he openly consults with the physician
who has treated the patient for the underlying physical
ailment.22 4
It would be difficult to require in all cases that a long-term
relationship be established before physician-assisted suicide
could be requested. In some instances a patient may have to
change doctors to find one who would comply with his or her
wishes because the regular physician is opposed to physician-
assisted suicide. Under the Death With Dignity Initiative,
many qualified patients do not have much time for a long-term
doctor/patient relationship because they are going to die
within six months. Moreover, people who are uninsured or on
Medicare may simply not have the means to develop a continu-
ing relationship with a physician.2
Nevertheless, in the absence of a relationship requirement
some patients may never be exposed to new treatments or pain
control that might alleviate discomfort and eliminate desires to
die. If no one takes the time to get to know the patient and his
221. HUMPHRY, supra note 4, at 93.
222. George P. Smith, All's Well That Ends Welk Toward a Policy of Assisted
Rational Suicide or Merely Enlightened Self-Determination?, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
275, 413 (1989).
223. NEWSwEEK, Dec. 2, 1991, at 88.
224. ABC NEWs, 20/20, Feb. 14, 1992.
225. Nancy S. Jecker, 17 J. OF HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 186, 189 (1992) (reviewing
DEREK HuMPHRY, FINAL ExIr. THE PRACTICALITIES OF SELF-DELIVERANCE AND
AssIsTED SUICIDE FOR THE DYING (1991)).
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or her needs, the patient may lose precious opportunities to
live a rewarding final few months.
In addition, it cannot be argued that doctors would not
make a business of suicide. Almost certainly, some doctors
would take patients just long enough to fulfill any statutory
requirements and collect the fees for suicide consulting. Simi-
lar practices are known among the medical community. For
example, one report indicates that over forty-four percent of
the coronary by-pass surgeries and twenty-five percent of the
pacemaker operations performed in this country were unneces-
sary.2 26 A relationship requirement would prevent at least
some "revolving door" practice.
In addition to comprehensive review of physical condition,
mental health evaluations are needed to protect patients by
having someone sit down and get to know the patient. Under-
standably, patients who are terminally ill or near death often
suffer from depression, which itself may cause a patient to
desire suicide. One study of people who attempted suicide
showed that regardless of the presence of physical illness, eve-
ryone studied demonstrated symptoms of depression.22
It is important for a mental health professional to deter-
mine that the patient is not suffering from clinical depression
before suicide is allowed. Like pain or other physical symp-
toms, depression can be separately treated, which may lead the
patient to change his or her mind about suicide.
Terminal patients also often fear abandonment or that
they are burden to their families. This fear may be a principle
reason behind a patient's decision to request physician-assisted
suicide. Professor Kamisar expressed his concern and asked,
"[w]ill we not sweep up, in the process, some who are not
really tired of life, but think others are tired of them. .. ?,,21
Mental health professionals can recognize these concerns and
help patients deal with them in ways other than physician-
assisted suicide.
The mental health of a patient is related to the require-
ment of mental competency and the ability of a patient to
make the decision to commit suicide. More comprehensive
226. Janice Castro, Condition Critical; Millions of Americans Have No Medical
Coverage, and Costs Are Out of Control, TIME, Nov. 25, 1991, at 34.
227. Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A Constitutional Right?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1,
131 (1985) (quoting Theodore L. Dorpat et al., The Relationship of Physical Illness to
Suicide, SUICIDE BEHAVIORS: DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT 209 (1968)).
228. Kamisar, supra note 188, at 990.
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competency determination procedures are necessary to protect
those who are not clearly competent or incompetent. For
example, a patient suffering from depression may be found
incompetent because he or she is suffering from a mental ill-
ness. On the other hand, the patient may be truly suffering
and capable of choosing physician-assisted suicide despite the
depression. One doctor expressed the problem as requiring
physician-assisted suicide to be carried out only when the
patient is "both sane and crazed by pain.
' 2 1
Moreover, the effects of painkillers may affect a patient's
mental capacity. Professor Kamisar asks, "[w]hen, then, does
the patient make the choice? While heavily drugged? Or is
narcotic relief to be withdrawn for the time of decision? But if
heavy dosage no longer deadens pain, indeed, no longer makes
it bearable, how overwhelming is it when whatever relief nar-
cotics offer is taken away too?"
Although a patient may erroneously request suicide
because of depression or the effects of pain killing medication,
the opposite may also be true. A patient may be denied the
legal right to physician-assisted suicide because of someone
else's belief that depression is behind the patient's wish to die
or that it is "the drugs talking" about suicide, not the patient.
The attending physician who is responsible for executing the
patient's directive may not have the psychiatric knowledge to
make less obvious competency determinations, or the attend-
ing physician may not have the time to find out.
One option when competency is in question is to appoint a
"guardian," who is a mental health practitioner. The guardian
can determine whether the patient is able to make the decision
to die and whether the patient understands the consequences.
Washington, for example, already provides procedures for
appointing guardians, limited guardians, and guardians ad
litem for incompetent people.23' Under current law, however,
guardians are not required to be mental heath professionals
who are able to determine the extent to which an illness or
depression affects the patient's ability to exercise his or her
legal rights. 3 2 Moreover, a guardian may have his or her own
opinion about physician-assisted suicide.
229. Id. at 986 (quoting I. Phillips Frohman, Vexing Problems In Forensic
Medicine: A Physician's View, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1215, 1222 (1956)).
230. Id. at 986-87.




Another problem is that a patient may be in a "gray area"
in terms of capacity, another factor of competency. A patient
may be mentally retarded and may not fully understand the
decision he or she is about to make. A competency procedure
will protect this patient. On the other hand, a person of less
than average intelligence is also entitled to the same personal
right to choose as others and may indeed know the conse-
quences. Without some form of competency evaluation, no one
will get to know the patient well enough to determine the
extent of his or her understanding and beliefs.
Finally, it is important that a patient be protected from
undue influence when requesting physician-assisted suicide.
Although living will statutes generally require witnesses who
are not related to the patient or who will not benefit from the
estate as beneficiaries or creditors, z 3 these witnesses are not
required to have any knowledge of the patient or of the cir-
cumstances surrounding his or her decision. Thus, the wit-
nesses may be unaware, or unable to detect, undue influence.
A dying patient may feel like a financial and emotional
burden to the family, using up assets to pay for expensive and
possibly futile treatment and straining family relationships by
requiring constant support from family members. These
patients may be extremely susceptible to influence in request-
ing physician-assisted suicide, especially if they also suffer
from depression. Professor Kamisar wrote that some patients
may "feel an obligation to have themselves 'eliminated' in
order that funds allocated for their terminal care might be bet-
ter used . ,,234
The economics of physician-assisted suicide is not a minor
consideration in light of the rising cost of medical care, the
rapid growth of the elderly segment of the population, and the
increase in the number of individuals suffering from AIDS, all
of whom may require months or years of costly care. The
average cost of hospitalization per day is over $4,200.00.235 For
a patient, the allocation of dwindling assets will be a prime
concern, especially if insurance coverage runs out, is denied, or
never existed. One out of every nine families, over thirty-
seven million people, in the United States have no health care
233. See id. § 70.122.030 (West Supp. 1992).
234. Kamisar, supra note 188, at 990.
235. 1991 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 32, at 108.
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insurance. 21 Dr. Nancy S. Jecker, a bioethicist at the Univer-
sity of Washington, is concerned that poor people faced with
massive medical bills might have been more likely to seek phy-
sician-assisted suicide had the initiative passed.' 7
For the families of terminally ill patients or patients near
death, the allocation of family resources may pose serious ques-
tions, especially where the family contributes to the cost of the
patient's care. A family business may be jeopardized or college
or retirement funds spent to care for a terminal patient. These
financial burdens of health care have already led to the grow-
ing number of abandoned elderly people, the phenomenon of
"granny dumping" described earlier.2s
Physicians and hospitals must also consider the allocation
of their time and resources. Other patients may benefit more
from a physician's time, the hospital's bedspace, and the pro-
fessional staff. Physicians may react by alienating themselves
from dying patients as a result of their frustration with their
inability to cure the patient,23 9 which in turn may make the
patient feel more isolated and burdensome.
As with the other safeguards, the result of having a
mental health professional get to know the patient may be to
protect the patient from undue influence. The mental health
professional can bring an objective view to the situation and
demonstrate to the patient that he or she may be choosing to
die for the wrong reasons.
Under Washington's proposed Death With Dignity Initia-
tive, patients were not protected even by the simple require-
ment of a waiting period between the time a patient signed the
written declaration and the time of the actual physician-
assisted suicide. ° Another proposed model statute does
require a thirty-day "cooling off period.214 1 Such a cooling-off
period would protect some patients who decide too quickly that
they want to die. "Need one marshal authority for the proposi-
tion that many an 'iffy' inclination is disregarded when the
236. Castro, supra note 226, at 34.
237. King, supra note 27, at A3.
238. See Steinberg, supra note 199.
239. Kamisar, supra note 188, at 992.
240. See Proposed Initiative 119, to amend WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 70.122 (West
Supp. 1992).
241. Arral A. Morris, Voluntary Euthanasia, 45 WASH. L. REV. 239, 257 (1970).
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actual facts are at hand?"'
The safeguards recommended in this Comment can be
effectuated by a neutral person who takes the time to review
the patient's desires with regard to treatment, mental health,
mental capacity, and possible undue influence. This person
may be another physician, psychiatrist, or mental health pro-
fessional. The presence of a physician may not always be nec-
essary, because it may be enough for the professional to be
familiar with various treatments and the symptoms of
depression.
243
If training in the care of those who are dying were made
readily available, the result might be that some professionals
would specialize in evaluating patients who request physician-
assisted suicide. Although it sounds like the creation of a new
field of "death doctors," telostricians,24 or obitiatrists, 45 as Dr.
Kevorkian calls himself, it must be considered how badly a
patient needs to be listened to before he or she makes the deci-
sion to end his or her life. If "death doctors" can help prevent
abuse, make life better for some patients, and possibly talk
them out of physician-assisted suicide, it would not be an objec-
tionable specialty after all.
242. Kamisar, supra note 188, at 989. Professor Kamisar also repeats one of
Aesop's fables:
It was a bitter-cold day in the wintertime, and an old man was gathering
broken branches in the forest to make a fire at home. The branches were
covered with ice, many of them were frozen and had to be pulled apart, and
his discomfort was intense. Finally, the poor old fellow became so thoroughly
wrought up by his suffering that he called loudly upon death to come. To his
surprise, Death came at once and asked what he wanted. Very hastily the old
man replied, 'Oh, nothing, nothing except to help me carry this bundle of
sticks home so that I may make a fire.'
Id. (citations omitted).
243. While this Comment was in its final editing stages an article appeared in THE
NEW ENGLAND JOURNAL OF MEDICINE, which lists seven "clinical criteria" for
physician-assisted suicide: (1) the patient must be suffering from an incurable
condition that includes severe unrelenting suffering, and must be fully informed of the
prognosis and types of comfort care available; (2) the physician must make sure that
the patient is not suffering from inadequate comfort or care; (3) the patient must
request assisted-death repeatedly and of his or her own free will; (4) the physician
must ascertain that the patient's judgment is not distorted; (5) there must exist a
meaningful doctor-patient relationship; (6) the physician must consult with other
experienced physicians; and (7) clear documentation of each criterion is required.
Quill et al., supra note 21, at 1381-82.
244. Brandt et al., supra note 16, at 142. "Telos" is defined "an ultimate end or
object." WEBsTER's THIRD NEw INT'L DICTIONARY 2352 (1971).
245. Treen et al., supra note 26, at 85.
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Dr. Kevorkian defended his "specialty" in a recent televi-
sion interview where he stated the following:
Every physician can't do this. That's what's wrong with all
the initiative drives and all the plans put forward now. You
can't let every doctor do this because some are outright crim-
inal. You can't allow that. It'll be abused. And some doc-
tors don't want to do it by temperament. Some can't do it by
religion. So you've got to have certain specialists qualified to
do this to whom a doctor can refer a patient like he does
everybody. 4
An "attorney-ethicist" remarked: "Do you really want to see
the full panoply of physicians, with their full range of compas-
sion and wisdom, practicing active euthanasia?" 247
Any statute that provides for physician-assisted suicide
must balance the need to protect vulnerable people against the
individual's right to self-determination. 2 " The statute pro-
posed below attempts to provide such safeguards while still
allowing physician-assisted suicide for certain people. Under
this proposed statute, eligible patients would include the fol-
lowing: those with terminal illnesses; those with diseases, such
as Alzheimer's Disease or multiple sclerosis, which lead to
nearly total impairment of mental or physical capacity; and
those, like Kenneth Bergstedt or Elizabeth Bouvia, for whom
suicide is simply a physical impossibility.
As safeguards, under the proposed statute, a patient must
establish at least a short relationship with his or her attending
physician, and he or she must see two mental health profes-
sionals. One mental health professional is chosen by the
patient and the other is appointed and paid for by the state.
These consultations will provide protection from mistake,
undue influence, and the effects of depression.
The proposed statute also includes a cooling-off period and
some procedural inconveniences. The statute attempts to avoid
making it too easy for those who have not given suicide much
thought, and it attempts to avoid making it too hard for those
who are truly suffering. Of course, the statute also provides
246. ABC NEWS, 20/20, Feb. 14, 1992.
247. Colen, supra note 23, at 4.
248. Brandt et al., supra note 16, at 179. This model act replaces court-imposed
limitations on self-determination with an Areopagitican licensing approach, using aid-




procedural protections if people who know the patient believe
in good faith that the patient is mentally incompetent or being
improperly influenced.
V. A MODEST PROPOSAL: AN ACT TO AUTHORIZE
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
Section 1. Definitions
(a) "Irremediable condition" means (1) a physical illness
that, within one year of application for assistance, will result in
the death of the patient; or (2) a physical condition or disease
that has or will result in the deterioration of normal physical
functions to the extent that the patient will be unable to live
without the complete custodial care of another, or that will
result in deterioration of normal mental functions to the
extent that the patient will be unable to live without the com-
plete custodial care of another.
(b) "Assistance" or "physician-assisted suicide" or
"assisted suicide" means medical service provided by a physi-
cian that will induce the death of a qualified patient.
(c) "Qualified patient" means a mentally competent per-
son over eighteen years of age diagnosed as having an irreme-
diable condition and who has submitted a completed
application for assisted suicide.
(d) "Attending physician" means the physician selected
by or assigned to the patient who has primary responsibility
for the treatment of the patient, who has diagnosed or
affirmed the diagnosis of the irremediable condition, and who
has personally examined the patient on at least two occasions.
(e) "Mental health professional" means a psychiatrist or
psychologist selected by the patient who has personally con-
sulted with the patient on at least one occasion.
(f) "State-registered mental health professional" means a
psychiatrist, psychologist, or social worker who has completed
training required by the State Secretary of Education for inclu-
sion on the state list for those qualified to evaluate applications
for physician-assisted suicide and who has registered with the
State Office of the Attorney General. The Attorney General
will assign state-registered mental health professionals from
the state list on a rotating basis to patients submitting applica-
tions with Parts One, Two, and Three completed. The state-
registered mental health professionals will receive compensa-
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tion for assistance consultations only from the state. The legis-
lature shall provide funding for the assistance consultations
from the general budget and from the application fees
received.
Section 2. Application for Physician-assisted Suicide
(a) The application form for physician-assisted suicide
shall be developed by the Attorney General and shall include
the following:
(1) Part One, to be completed by the patient, must be
signed by the patient in the presence of two witnesses not
related to the patient by blood or marriage and who will
receive no portion of the patient's estate upon the patient's
death. It must certify that the patient is requesting assistance
voluntarily.
(2) Part Two, to be completed by the attending physician,
must certify that the patient has an irremediable condition, has
voluntarily requested the assistance, and has been fully
informed of the prognosis and all health care or continuous
care alternatives.
(3) Part Three, to be completed by a mental health pro-
fessional, must certify the following: that the patient is men-
tally competent, that the patient has voluntarily requested the
assistance, that the patient has been informed of health care or
continuous care alternatives, and that the patient is not sub-
stantially affected by a treatable mental condition (such as
clinical depression) independent of the underlying physical
condition. The mental health professional shall also certify
that he or she has consulted with the patient's attending physi-
cian regarding the patient's diagnosis, prognosis, and attitude
toward the illness and the application for assistance.
(4) Part Four, to be completed by a state-registered
mental health professional, who shall consult in person with
the patient on two separate occasions at least 30 days apart.
The state-registered mental health professional shall:
(i) certify that the patient is requesting assistance voluntarily
and that the patient understands the diagnosis, prognosis, and
alternatives for health care and/or continuous care from gov-
ernmental, charitable, and private sources;
(ii) certify that he or she has consulted with both the attend-
ing physician and the mental health professional who com-
pleted Parts One and Two of the application for assistance
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concerning the patient's diagnosis, prognosis, attitude toward
the illness, the application for assistance, and the effect of an
independent treatable mental condition; and
(iii) verify on the second consultation with the patient, that
the patient voluntarily requests assistance, that the motivation
or desire for assistance is not supplied by relatives or anyone
other than the patient, and that there has been no reasonably
discernable change in the patient's attitude toward the request
for assistance.
Section 3. Application Procedure for Physician-assisted
Suicide
(a) The patient must submit a fee of $50.00 and an application
for assistance to the office of the State Attorney General with
Parts One, Two, and Three completed.
(b) The Attorney General shall assign the next state-regis-
tered mental health professional on the rotation list who shall
consult with the patient as required and complete Part Four of
the application.
(c) If the patient's application is properly verified by the med-
ical professionals, the Attorney General shall approve the
application. Once approved, the Attorney General shall notify
the patient and the attending physician.
(d) If any medical professional completing the form or any
family member believes in good faith that the patient is not
voluntarily requesting assistance, is acting under improper
influence, or is mentally incompetent, complaint may be made
to a superior court for review.
(e) The patient will be deemed to have revoked intent to
obtain assistance by destroying or defacing the application or
notice of approval. The patient may also communicate revoca-
tion to the attending physician.
Section 4. Protection for Medical Personnel
(a) No person shall be under any duty, whether by contract
or by any statutory or other legal requirement, to participate
in any aspect of assistance authorized by this act to which he or
she has a conscientious objection, except that state employees
and state-registered mental health professionals and anyone
else who undertakes to effectuate the desires of the patient
within the requirements of this statute must act in good faith.
(b) A physician or nurse who in good faith renders assistance
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within the terms of this statute shall not be civilly or crimi-
nally liable.
(c) Physicians and nurses who have taken part in the admin-
istration of physician-assisted suicide within the terms of this
statute shall not be deemed to be in breach of any professional
oath or affirmation.
(d) To establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim
against the physician, mental health professional, or nurse
based on a patient request for physician-assisted suicide, the
patient will be deemed to have waived any physician-patient
privilege with regard to any matters connected with the
assisted suicide or request.
Section 5. Insurance
No existing policy of insurance that has been in force for
twelve months prior to the date that an application for physi-
cian-assisted suicide is submitted to the Office of the Attorney
General shall be invalidated or legally impaired in any way by
the rendering of assistance with the terms of this statute. No
new policy of life insurance shall include a promise to refrain
from requesting physician-assisted suicide as a condition to the
issuance of the policy, except that an initial two-year period
may be established during which the patient may not request
physician-assisted suicide.
Section 6. Offenses
(a) Any person who wilfully falsifies or forges an applica-
tion to create the false impression that the patient desires phy-
sician-assisted suicide shall be subject to prosecution for
murder in the first degree.
(b) Any person who wilfully conceals, cancels, defaces,
obliterates, or damages the application or notice of approval of
another without that person's consent shall be guilty of a gross
misdemeanor.
(c) Any person who applies to a superior court seeking
disapproval of an application for physician-assisted suicide
shall be liable for costs, including attorney's fees, if such per-
son complains to the court without a showing of good faith
belief that the person applying for assistance is mentally
incompetent or acting under improper influence.
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Section 7 Effect on Other Health Care Directives
An application for physician-assisted suicide shall not
alter, substitute for, or in any way affect any directive to physi-
cians executed under the Natural Death Act, 49 or any other
similar directive recognized by the laws of this state, for the
withholding or withdrawal of medical treatment and/or life-
sustaining procedures.
VI. CONCLUSION
As with most laws affecting what can be construed as pri-
vate rights, the right of the individual to self-determination
must be balanced against the implicated societal interest. On
the one hand, in "right to die" cases, the societal interests are
the assumptions that life must be protected, that society has
the right and the duty to prevent suicide, and that when self-
determination becomes self-destructive, the individual's right
must be overcome. On the other hand, these cases illustrate
that when faced with the painful circumstances of a Kenneth
Bergstedt or an Elizabeth Bouvia, society may step aside and
say, in essence, that "O.K., maybe a person in your position
could say that your life is not worth living, and we won't stop
you."y
The problem is determining who society will step aside for
and who will be protected. Currently, this determination is
left to judges, their own convictions, and their ability to tie the
particular facts of the case to the doctrine of informed consent.
For some it may be a only a question of individual choice, but
for others it is one that requires a societal consensus of where
the line will be drawn.25 °
With reference to a recent trend of harvesting organs from
the "newly dead," and the problem of determining at what
moment that occurs, one health law professor stated the
following:
Life and death is not an individual question. As a society, we
ought to be able to agree on who is dead and who is alive. In
some sense, it's arbitrary, but the life/death line has got to
be solid.
The litmus test is this: Would you feel comfortable bur-
249. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.090 (West Supp. 1992).
250. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2862 (1990)
(Scalia, J., concurring); McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 632 (Nev. 1990) (Springer, J.,
dissenting).
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ying this person while she is still breathing on her own? If
not, you know at some level she is not dead."'
Allowing physician-assisted suicide will require a similar
litmus test: Would you feel comfortable agreeing with this per-
son that his or her life is not worth living? If not, then society
should continue to protect that person. The statutory scheme
proposed in this Comment provides such a bright line categori-
zation, which may be too broad for some and too restrictive for
others.
Nevertheless, it is a line. It provides guidance, and it artic-
ulates a policy regarding physician-assisted suicide. Reluctance
to make such a public policy is understandable, but also ill-
advised. Such public policies are required to prevent "people
with pipes" from effectuating their own private policies. Such
policies are necessary to relieve the fears of opponents of phy-
sician-assisted suicide that safeguards will not adequately pro-
tect the elderly, the handicapped, or the mentally ill. Such
policies will also ensure that the individual right of the self-
determination is respected.
251. Judy Foreman, Organ Donations: Where Do We Draw the Line?, THE
SEATLE TIMES, Apr. 27, 1992, at A3 (quoting George Annas of Boston University).
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